


NashProp

- A heuristic for computing NE in graphical games with arbitrary graphs.
- A generalization of TreeNash.

Basic idea


- Each player neighborhood looks locally like a tree.
- So, apply same "table" computation (message-passing operation) as in TreeNash (the algorithm for trees).
- But, there is no global root (in arbitrary graphs):
From the player's local perspective, "the player doesn't know where the root is" [actually, there might not be any!]
- So, each player "sends table message" to each neighbor as if "root" could be reached through that neighbor.
[process can be done distributedly and asynchronously]



- Two phases: table-passing phase, assignment-passing phase.

Recall: Tree Nash

- ① Only propagate tables "down" the tree to root; then only propagate solutions "up" the tree to leaves



- ② No "initialization" needed: use "leaves" to initialize.

Nash Prop

- ① Propagate tables in rounds; each player sends a table to every neighbor.

Table Propagation "rule" is the same as in Tree Nash, except that it is executed for each neighbor independently.

At each round t ,

$$\forall (w, v) \in E, \forall (w, r) \in [0, 1]^2,$$

edge set of graph.

$$T^t(w, v) = 1 \text{ iff } \exists \text{ a witness } \vec{u} \in [0, 1]^{k-2}, \text{ s.t.}$$

size of V_k neighborhood

$$1. T^{t-1}(v, u_i) = 1, \forall i = 1, \dots, k-2$$

2. $v = r$ is a best response to $w = w, \vec{u} = \vec{u}$

- ② How do we start? (i.e. What about $t=1$?)

Initialize to "full" tables [i.e., $\forall (w, v) \in E, \forall (w, r) \in [0, 1]^2, T^0(w, r) = 1$]

Intuition: Lacking any initial knowledge, a player "believes" any strategy is a best response to any other strategy.

②

Analysis of Abstract Table-passing phase

Remarks:

$$\forall (W, V) \in E, \forall (w, v) \in [0, 1]^2,$$

$$T^{t-1}(w, v) = 0 \Rightarrow T^t(w, v) = 0$$

$$\{(w, v) \in [0, 1]^2 : T^{t-1}(w, v) = 1\} \supseteq \{(w, v) \in [0, 1]^2 : T^t(w, v) = 1\}$$

• So, "tables" converge! $\left[\forall (W, V) \in E, \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \{(w, v) \in [0, 1]^2 : T^t(w, v) = 1\} = \{(w, v) : T^*(w, v) = 1\} \right]$

Defn: Given a graphical game, we say a set of tables exists!

$\{T_{wv} : [0, 1]^2 \rightarrow [0, 1], \forall (W, V) \in E\}$ for the game is balanced if

$\forall (W, V) \in E, \forall (w, v) \in [0, 1]^2, T(w, v) = 1 \text{ iff } \exists \vec{u} \in [0, 1]^{k-2}, \text{ an assignment}$
to neighbors \vec{U} of V other than W ,

s.t.

$$1. T(v, u_i) = 1, \forall i = 1, \dots, k-2$$

$$2. V = \vec{v} \text{ is B.R. to } W = w, \vec{u} = \vec{u}.$$

Defn: A joint mixed strategy $\vec{p} \in [0, 1]^n$ (^{# of players}) is consistent with balanced tables $\{T_{wv}\}$ if $\forall (W, V) \in E, T_{wv}(p_w, p_v) = 1$.

Observation: The limit tables $\{T_{wv}^*\}$ are balanced.

* A characterization of Nash equilibria in a graphical game:

A mixed strategy \vec{p} is a NE for the graphical game G iff
 \vec{p} is consistent with the limit (balanced) tables for G.

Approximate NE

- As in ApproxTreeNash, discretize each player's mixed strategy space.

$$\forall \epsilon \in \mathbb{T} = \{0, \epsilon, 2\epsilon, \dots, 1\}$$

- Gridding size sufficiency results hold for ^{games with} arbitrary graph. So, set

$$\tau = \frac{\epsilon}{2K} \quad \text{as before.}$$

- Table size $\lceil \frac{1}{\tau} \rceil^2 = O\left(\left(\frac{2K}{\epsilon}\right)^2\right)$ [Poly in game representation size]

Running time (per round, per player, per neighbor):

$$O\left((2\lceil \frac{1}{\tau} \rceil)^k\right) = O\left((\frac{4K}{\epsilon})^k\right)$$

[For k , s.t. $k \log k = O(\log n)$, poly in representation size]

\uparrow \uparrow
 max neighborhood size. # of players

- Convergence result \Rightarrow Table-passing phase converges in a finite # of rounds. So total running time for this phase:

$$O\left(|E| \underbrace{\left(\frac{2K}{\epsilon}\right)^2}_{\text{max. # of rounds.}} \underbrace{\left(\frac{4K}{\epsilon}\right)^k}_{\substack{\text{each} \\ \text{table} \\ \text{computation} \\ \text{per round}}} |E| \underbrace{\# \text{ of tables}}_{\substack{\text{# of tables} \\ \text{[computed per round]}}} \right) = O\left(n^2 K^{k+1} 2^{3K} \left(\frac{1}{\epsilon}\right)^{k+2}\right)$$

for $k \leq k \log(k)$,
 poly in model size

- at each round, at least one table entry changes [from 1 to 0]
- We have $|E|$ tables, each of size $O(\frac{1}{\tau^2})$.
 \uparrow Recall, G undirected, so $(W, V) \in E \Rightarrow (V, W) \in E$
 [Easy to modify to directed case].

Observation: Lemma 6 of KLS. (union of rectangles representation) is general, So it applies here. Hence, we can do table-message passing exactly for 2-action games, BLTF

- it might not converge in finite time!
- Table representation can grow exponentially with the # of rounds!

Assignment-passing phase

Basic Idea: Table-passing phase might have left us with a significantly smaller search space!

[See Accompanying PowerPoint presentation for an example of ideal behavior].


- A "generalization" of "upstream pass" in TreeNash BUT with a "wrinkle".

• Defn: The projection set P_V of player V as

$$\forall v \in [0,1], P_V(v) = 1 \text{ iff } \exists \vec{u} \in [0,1]^{K-1}, \text{ s.t.}$$

- $T(v, u_i) = 1, \forall i = 1, \dots, K-1$
- $V = v$ is BR to $\vec{U} = \vec{u}$.

[Alternative definitions exist]



Algorithm Sketch [for Assignment-passing phase]

Initialization: • Pick arbitrary player V

- Select a ~~mixed~~ strategy $v \in P_V(v) = 1$
[non-deterministically]

Iterate: • At each round,

• In some sequential order over each player V ,

- if V has been set to v

- if V has unset neighbors,

- set unset neighbors st.

- resulting assignment to all
neighbors is a witness

- [i.e. if \vec{U} is assignment to all
neighbors,

- $T(v, U_i) = 1, \forall i = 1, \dots, k-1$

- $V=v$ is B.R. to $\vec{U}=\vec{U}$

- if not possible, backtrack!

- else, check for "consistency"

- backtrack if inconsistent
neighborhood assignment

Remarks: • For tree graphical games, no backtracking necessary!

- In general, need to backtrack to take care of
inconsistencies

- Assignment-passing phase is worst case
exponential in # of players.

[See Accompanying PowerPoint presentation for experimental results]