# The Polynomial Weights Algorithm: Warmup 

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- This lecture: learning in games.
- First we'll abstract away the game...


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3. The market can behave arbitrarily/adversarially... So no way you can promise to do well.
4. But... You get advice.

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4. Lets start with an easier case.

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Can we find a strategy that is guaranteed to make at most $\log (N)$ mistakes?

## The Halving Algorithm

Algorithm 1 The Halving Algorithm
Let $S^{1} \leftarrow\{1, \ldots, N\}$ be the set of all experts.
for $t=1$ to $T$ do
Let $S_{U}^{t}=\left\{i \in S: p_{i}^{t}=U\right\}$ be the set of experts in $S^{t}$ who predict up, and $S_{D}^{t}=S^{t} \backslash S_{U}^{t}$ be the set who predict down. Predict with the majority vote: If $\left|S_{U}^{t}\right|>\left|S_{D}^{t}\right|$, predict $p_{A}^{t}=U$, else predict $p_{A}^{t}=D$.
Eliminate all experts that made a mistake: If $o^{T}=U$, then let $S^{t+1}=S_{U}^{t}$, else let $S^{t+1}=S_{D}^{t}$
end for

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4. Hence $\left|S^{t}\right| \geq 1$ for all $t$.

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3. On the other hand, the perfect expert is never eliminated.
4. Hence $\left|S^{t}\right| \geq 1$ for all $t$.
5. Since $\left|S^{1}\right|=N$, this means there can be at most $\log N$ mistakes.

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3. And the bound doesn't grow with $T$, so even with a huge number of experts, the average number of mistakes made by this algorithm is tiny.
4. But what if no expert is perfect? Say the best expert makes OPT mistakes.
5. Can we find a way to make not too many more than OPT mistakes?

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Algorithm 2 The Iterated Halving Algorithm
Let $S^{1} \leftarrow\{1, \ldots, N\}$ be the set of all experts.
for $t=1$ to $T$ do
If $\left|S^{t}\right|=0$ Reset: Set $S^{t} \leftarrow\{1, \ldots, N\}$.
Let $S_{U}^{t}=\left\{i \in S: p_{i}^{t}=U\right\}$ be the set of experts in $S^{t}$ who predict up, and $S_{D}^{t}=S^{t} \backslash S_{U}^{t}$ be the set who predict down. Predict with the majority vote: If $\left|S_{U}^{t}\right|>\left|S_{D}^{t}\right|$, predict $p_{A}^{t}=U$, else predict $p_{A}^{t}=D$.
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5. This gives the claimed bound.

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3. What should we do instead?
4. To be continued...

## Thanks!

See you next class - stay healthy!

