Basic Definitions

In this class we introduce some of the basic definitions we will be using throughout the semester. First, what is a game?

**Definition 1** A game is an interaction defined by:

1. A set of players \( P \)
2. A finite set of actions \( A_i \) for each player \( i \in P \). We write \( A = \times_{i=1}^{n} A_i \) to denote the action space for all players, and \( A_{-i} = \times_{j \neq i} A_j \) to denote the action space of all players excluding player \( j \).
3. A utility function \( u_i : A \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) for each player \( i \in P \).

The basic assumption in game theory is that players will always try and act so as to maximize their utility. This is well defined when the actions of the other players are fixed:

**Definition 2** The best-response to a set of actions \( a_{-i} \in A_{-i} \) for a player \( i \) is any action \( a_i \in A_i \) that maximizes \( u_i(a_i, a_{-i}) \):

\[
    a_i \in \arg \max_{a \in A_i} u_i(a, a_{-i})
\]

A general idea in game theory is this: “In any stable situation, all players should be playing a best response. (Otherwise, by definition, the situation would not be stable – somebody would want to change their action.)

So we can ask: when are there stable solutions?

**Definition 3** For a player \( i \), an action \( a \in A_i \) (weakly) dominates action \( a' \in A_i \) if it is always beneficial to play \( a \) over \( a' \). That is, if for all \( a_{-i} \in A_{-i} \):

\[
    u_i(a, a_{-i}) \geq u_i(a', a_{-i})
\]

and the inequality is strict for some \( a_{-i} \in A_{-i} \).

You can normally eliminate weakly dominated strategies from consideration – there is never a situation in which they are the uniquely optimal best response.

**Definition 4** An action \( a \in A_i \) is dominant for player \( i \) if it weakly dominates all actions \( a' \neq a \in A_i \).

Note that if an action \( a \) is dominant, this is a very strong guarantee – it is always a best response, and so a rational player can safely play it without needing to reason about what her opponents are doing.

Dominant strategies will typically not exist, but when they do exist for all players, it is easy to see what rational players should do:

**Definition 5** An action profile \( a = (a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in A \) is a dominant strategy equilibrium of the game \((P, \{A_i\}, \{u_i\})\) if for every \( i \in P \), \( a_i \) is a dominant strategy for player \( i \).

**Example 1** (Confess, Confess) is a dominant strategy equilibrium is Prisoner’s Dilemma.
How should we make predictions if a dominant strategy equilibrium does not exist? Even in this case, there may still be dominated strategies, which we can remove from consideration. Eliminating these leads to a new, residual game, in which further strategies might be dominated. Continuing in this way can sometimes lead to a unique remaining action profile. This is called “Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies” (we did several examples on the board).

What if this process doesn’t eliminate anything? We can still directly ask for a “stable” profile of actions:

**Definition 6** A profile of actions $a = (a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in A$ is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium if for each player $i \in P$ and for all $a'_i \in A_i$:

$$u_i(a_i, a_{-i}) \geq u_i(a'_i, a_{-i})$$

i.e. simultaneously, all players are playing a best response to one another.

This seems like a reasonable solution concept, but does using it as a prediction contradict what we might predict using iterated elimination of dominated strategies? No:

**Claim 7** If iterated elimination of dominated strategies results in a unique solution, then it is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

**Proof** Homework! ■

Unfortunately, pure strategy Nash equilibria are neither guaranteed to exist, nor to be unique when they do exist.

**Example 2** Battle of the sexes has two pure strategy Nash equilibria, and matching pennies has none.

So how should one predict behavior in a game in which no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists? Lets take matching pennies as an example: how should you play? (nb: matching pennies is an example of a zero-sum game, which we will study in more depth later):

**Definition 8** A two-player game is zero-sum if for all $a \in A$, $u_1(a) = -u_2(a)$. (i.e. the utilities of of both players sum to zero at every action profile)

In matching pennies (like rock paper scissors) you should randomize to thwart your opponent: the best you can do is to flip a coin and play heads 50% of the time, and tails 50% of the time. Lets give a definition that allows us to reason about randomized strategies like this.

**Definition 9** A mixed-strategy $p_i \in \Delta A_i$ is a probability distribution over actions $a_i \in A_i$: i.e. a set of numbers $p_i(a_i)$ such that:
1. \( p_i(a_i) \geq 0 \) for all \( a_i \in A_i \)

2. \( \sum_{a_i \in A_i} p_i(a_i) = 1. \)

For \( p = (p_1, \ldots, p_n) \in \Delta A_1 \times \ldots \times \Delta A_n \), we write:

\[
u_i(p) = E_{a_i \sim p_i}[u_i(a)]\]

i.e. we assume that each player draws an action independently from her mixed strategy, and that player \( i \)'s utility for this randomized set of actions is her expected utility of the realization. (We are implicitly assuming here that agents are risk-neutral).

**Definition 10** A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is a tuple \( p = (p_1, \ldots, p_n) \in \Delta A_1 \times \ldots \times \Delta A_n \) such that for all \( i \), and for all \( a_i \in A_i \):

\[
u_i(p, p_{-i}) \geq u_i(a, p_{-i})\]

Fortunately, these always exist!

**Theorem 11 (Nash)** Every game with a finite set of players and actions has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.

(The proof is non-constructive, so its not necessarily clear how to find one of these, even though they exist).