CIS 551 / TCOM 401 Computer and Network Security

Spring 2007 Lecture 22

Announcements

- Project 4 is available on the web:
 - Due Friday April 20th at 11:59 PM

 Some of today's slides adopted from Dan Boneh and John Mitchell's courses at Stanford

Maintaining State

- HTTP is a stateless protocol
 - Server doesn't store any information about the connections it handles (each request is treated independently)
 - Makes it hard to maintain session information
- Encode state in the URL:
 - …/cgi-bin/nxt?state=-189534fjk
 - Used commonly on message boards, etc. to track thread
- Use HIDDEN input fields
 - When user fills in web forms, the POST request gives server the data
 - You can embed state in invisible "input" fields
- Cookies
 - Store data on the client's machine

Hidden Fields

```
<html>
<head> <title>My Page</title> </head>
<body>
<form name="myform"
       action="http://.../handle.cgi"
       method="POST">
<div align="center">
  <input type="text" size="25" value="Name?">
  <input type="hidden" name="Language"</pre>
  value="English">
 <br><br></div> </form>
</body>
</html>
```

Cookies (Client-side state)

• Server can store cookies on the client machine by issuing:

```
Set-Cookie: NAME=VALUE; [expires=DATE;]
[path=PATH;] [domain=DOMAIN_NAME;]
[secure]
```

- Domain and Path restrict the servers (and paths on those servers) to which the cookie will be sent
- The "secure" flag says that the cookie should only be sent over HTTPS
- Uses:
 - User authentication
 - Personalization
 - User tracking: e.g. Doubleclick (3rd party cookies)


Cookies (cont'd)


- When the client requests a URL from a server, the browser matches the URL against all cookies on the client.
- If they match, then the client request includes the line:
 Cookie: NAME1=STRING1; NAME2=STRING2;...
- Notes:
 - New instances of cookies overwrite old ones
 - Clients aren't required to purge expired cookies (though they shouldn't send them)
 - Cookies can be at most 4k, at most 20 per site
 - To delete a cookie, the server can send a cookie with expires set to a past date
 - HTTP proxy servers shouldn't cache Set-cookie headers...

Cookies

Http is stateless protocol; cookies add state

Used to store state on user's machine





Cookie risks

- Danger of storing data on browser:
 - User can change values
- <u>Silly example</u>: Shopping cart software.
 <u>Set-cookie</u>: <u>shopping-cart-total</u> = 150 (\$)
 - User edits cookie file (cookie poisoning):
 Cookie: shopping-cart-total = 15 (\$)
 - ... bargain shopping.
- Similar behavior with hidden fields:

<INPUT TYPE="hidden" NAME=price VALUE="150">

Not so silly ..

- D3.COM Pty Ltd: ShopFactory 5.8
- @Retail Corporation: @Retail
- Adgrafix: Check It Out
- Baron Consulting Group: WebSite Tool
- ComCity Corporation: SalesCart
- Crested Butte Software: EasyCart
- Dansie.net: Dansie Shopping Cart
- Intelligent Vending Systems: Intellivend
- Make-a-Store: Make-a-Store OrderPage
- McMurtrey/Whitaker & Associates: Cart32 3.0
- pknutsen@nethut.no: CartMan 1.04
- Rich Media Technologies: JustAddCommerce 5.0
- SmartCart: SmartCart
- Web Express: Shoptron 1.2
- Source: http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/4621

Example: dansie.net shopping cart

• http://www.dansie.net/demo.html (April, 2007)

<FORM METHOD=POST

ACTION="http://www.dansie.net/cgi-bin/scripts/cart.pl">

Black Leather purse with leather straps
Price: \$20.00

<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=name VALUE="Black leather purse">
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=price VALUE="20.00">
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=sh VALUE="1">
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=img VALUE="1">
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=img VALUE="1">
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=img VALUE="purse.jpg">
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=return
VALUE="http://www.dansie.net/demo.html">
<INPUT TYPE=HIDDEN NAME=custom1 VALUE="Black leather purse
with leather straps">

<INPUT TYPE=SUBMIT NAME="add" VALUE="Put in Shopping Cart">


</FORM>

• CVE-2000-0253 (Jan. 2001), BugTraq ID: 1115

Solution

- When storing state on browser MAC data using server secret key.
- .NET 2.0:
 - System.Web.Configuration.MachineKey
 - Secret web server key intended for cookie protection
 - HttpCookie cookie = new HttpCookie(name, val);
 HttpCookie encodedCookie =
 HttpSecureCookie.Encode (cookie);
 - HttpSecureCookie.Decode (cookie);

Cookie authentication




Weak authenticators: security risk

- Predictable cookie authenticator
 - Verizon Wireless counter
 - Valid user logs in, gets counter, can view sessions of other users.
- Weak authenticator generation:
 - WSJ.com: cookie = {user, MAC_k(user) }
 - Weak MAC exposes K from few cookies.
- Apache Tomcat: generateSessionID()
 - MD5(PRNG) ... but weak PRNG
 - Predictable SessionID's

Cookie auth is insufficient

- <u>Example</u>:
 - User logs in to bank.com. Forgets to sign off.
 - Session cookie remains in browser state
 - Then user visits another site containing:
 - <form name=F action=http://bank.com/BillPay.php>
 - <input name=recipient value=badguy> ...
 - <script> document.F.submit(); </script>
 - Browser sends user auth cookie with request
 - Transaction will be fulfilled
- <u>Problem</u>:
 - cookie auth is insufficient when side effects can happen
 - Correct use: use cookies + hidden fields

Managing cookie policy via proxy



• Can do other checks: filter ads, block sites, etc.


Sample Proxy:

JUNK**busters**

- Cookie management by policy in *cookiefile*
 - Default: all cookies are silently crunched
 - Options
 - Allow cookies only to/from certain sites
 - Block cookies to browser (but allow to server)
 - Send vanilla wafers instead
- Block URLs matching any pattern in *blockfile*
 - Example: pattern /*.*/ad matches http://nomatterwhere.com/images/advert/g3487.gif


Easy to write your own http proxy; you can try *this* at home

Fooling the user




User thinks it is ebuy.com, enters eBuy username and password.

Password Phishing Problem




- User cannot reliably identify fake sites
- Captured password can be used at target site

Common Password Problem



- Phishing attack or break-in at site B reveals pwd at A
 - Server-side solutions will not keep pwd safe
 - Solution: Strengthen with client-side support

Password Hashing



Protects against common password problem

The Spoofing Problem

• JavaScript can display password fields or dialogs:

Prompt	
?	Enter username and password for "DemoRealm" at 127.0.0.1:8080 User Name:
	Pessword:
	Use Pessword Manager to remember this pessword.
	OK Cancel

Unhashed password sent to attacker in clear

Connect to www.verisign.com			
		G P	
Please Enter Your Support Username and Password:			
<u>U</u> ser name:	2	~	
<u>P</u> assword:			
	ОК	Cancel	

eBay User ID




Password

•••

Forgot your password?

Sign In Securely >

Password Prefix



Password Prefix: How it works

- Abnormal operation: Prefix in non-password field
 - Can just ignore the prefix and not hash
 - Remind user not to enter password

The Perfect Phishing Email

Fooling the user using browser state

- Bank of America customers see:
 - "Click here to see your Bank of America statement"
- Wells Fargo customers see:
 - "Click here to see your Wells Fargo statement"
- Works in Outlook; behavior is by design

Reading browser history

- CSS properties of hyperlinks
- Can also use cache-based techniques

Violation of the same-origin principle:

"One site cannot use information belonging to another site."

Visited link tracking http://www.safehistory.com/

- Visited links displayed in different color (74% of sites)
 - Information easily accessible by javascript
- Attacks also without javascript

```
<html><head>
<style> a { position:absolute; border:0; } a:link { display:none } </style>
</head><body>
<a href='http://www.bankofamerica.com/'><img src='bankofamerica.gif'></a>
<a href='https://www.wellsfargo.com/'><img src='wellsfargo.gif'></a>
<a href='http://www.usbank.com/'><img src='usbank.gif'></a>
...
```

- Bank logo images are stacked on top of each other
- CSS rules cause the un-visited links to vanish
- Page displays bank logo of site that user has visited

Preserving web privacy


- Your IP address may be visible to web sites
 - This may reveal your employer, ISP, etc.
 - Can link activities on different sites, different times
- Can you prevent sites from learning about you?
 - Anonymizer
 - Single site that hides origin of web request
 - Crowds
 - Distributed solution

Anonymity?

- Sender anonymity:
 - The identity of the sender is hidden, while the receiver (and message) might not be
- Receiver anonymity:
 - The identity of the receiver is hidden (message and sender might not be)
- Unlikability of sender and receiver:
 - Although the sender and receiver can be identified as participating in communication, they cannot be identified as communicating *with each other*.


Browsing Anonymizers

- Anonymizer.com
- Web Anonymizer hides your IP address



• What does anonymizer.com know about you?


Related approach to anonymity



- Hide source of messages by routing them randomly
- Routers don't know for sure if the apparent source of the message is the actual sender or simply another router
 - Only secure against <u>local</u> attackers!
- Existing systems: Freenet, Crowds, etc.

Crowds

http://avirubin.com/crowds.pdf [Reiter,Rubin '98]



- Sender randomly chooses a path through the crowd
- Some routers are honest, some corrupt
- After receiving a message, honest router flips a coin
 - With probability P_f routes to the next member on the path
 - With probability 1- P_f sends directly to the recipient

What Does Anonymity Mean?

- Degree of anonymity:
 - Ranges from absolute privacy to provably exposed
- Beyond suspicion
 - The observed source of the message is no more likely to be the actual sender than anybody else
- Probable innocence
 - Probability <50% that the observed source of the message is the actual sender

Guaranteed by Crowds if there are sufficiently few corrupt routers

- Possible innocence
 - Non-trivial probability that the observed source of the message is not the actual sender