CIS 551 / TCOM 401

Computer and Network Security

Spring 2006

Lecture 13

Recap

- Last time:
  - Authentication protocol with public keys
  - Digital Signatures
- Today:
  - Key distribution
  - Needham-Schroeder
  - Kerberos

Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol



Key Establishment

- Symmetric keys.
  - Point-to-Point.
  - Needham-Schroeder.
  - Kerberos.

Point-to-Point



- Should also use timestamps & nonces.
- Session key should include a validity duration.

Key Distribution Centers



Distribution Center Setup

- A wishes to communicate with B.
- T (trusted 3rd party) provides session keys.
- T has a key K_{AT} in common with A and a key K_{BT} in common with B.
- A authenticates T using a nonce n_A and obtains a session key from T.
- A authenticates to B and transports the session key securely.

Needham-Schroeder Key Distribution Protocol

1. $A \rightarrow T$: A, B, n_A
2. $T \rightarrow A$: $K_{AT}\{K_S, n_A, B, K_{BT}\{K_S, A\}\}$

   A decrypts with K_{AT} and checks n_A and B. Holds K_S for future correspondence with B.

3. $A \rightarrow B$: $K_{BT}\{K_S, A\}$

   B decrypts with K_{BT}.

4. $B \rightarrow A$: $K_S\{n_B\}$

   A decrypts with K_S.

5. $A \rightarrow B$: $K_S\{n_B - 1\}$

   B checks n_B-1.

Attack Scenario 1

1. $A \rightarrow T$: A, B, n_A
2. $T \rightarrow C$ (A) : $K_{AT}\{k, n_A, B, K_{BT}\{K_S, A\}\}$

   C is unable to decrypt the message to A; passing it along unchanged does no harm. Any change will be detected by A.

Attack Scenario 2

1. $A \rightarrow C (T)$: A, B, n_A
2. $C (A) \rightarrow T$: A, C, n_A
3. $T \rightarrow A$: $K_{AT}\{K_S, n_A, C, K_{CT}\{K_S, A\}\}$

Rejected by A because the message contains C rather than B.

Attack Scenario 3

1. $A \rightarrow C(T)$: A, B, n_A
2. $C \rightarrow T$: C, B, n_A
3. $T \rightarrow C$: $K_{CT}\{K_S, n_A, B, K_{BT}\{K_S, C\}\}$
4. $C(T) \rightarrow A$: $K_{CT}\{K_S, n_A, B, K_{BT}\{K_S, C\}\}$

A is unable to decrypt the message.

Attack Scenario 4

1. $C \rightarrow T$: C, B, n_A
2. $T \rightarrow C$: $K_{CT}\{K_S, n_A, B, K_{BT}\{K_S, C\}\}$
3. C (A) $\rightarrow$ B : $K_{BT}\{K_S, C\}$

B will see that the purported origin (A) does not match the identity indicated by the distribution center.

Valid Attack

- The attacker records the messages on the network (in particular, the messages sent in step 3)
- Consider an attacker that manages to get an old session key K_S.
- That attacker can then masquerade as Alice:
  - Replay starting from step 3 of the protocol, but using the message corresponding to K_S.

- Could be prevented with time stamps.

Kerberos

- Reading: "Kerberos: An Authentication Service for Open Network Systems" (by Steiner, Neuman, Schiller 1988)
  - Available on course web pages (along with link to Kerberos FAQ)

- Key exchange protocol developed at MIT in the late 1980's
- Central server provides "tickets"
- *Tickets* – (a form of *capabilities*):
  - Unforgeable
  - Nonreplayable
  - Authenticated
  - Represent authority
- Designed to work with NFS (network file system)
- Also saves on authenticating for each service
  - e.g. with rlogin or rsh.

Kerberos



Service Request
Ticket-granting server
User
Service ticket
Authentication
TGT
Service request
Auth. key
Unique keys
Kerberos Server
File Server
Other Server

Kerberos Login

- U = User's machine
- S = Kerberos Server
  - Has a database of user passwords: userID → pwd
- G = Ticket granting server

- U → S : userID, G, n_U
- S → U : $k_{pwd}\{n_U, K_{UG}\}, K_{SG}\{T(U,G)\}$
- S → G : $K_{SG}\{K_{UG}, \text{userID}\}$

- $T(X,Y) = X, Y, \text{addr}(X), L, K_{XY}$

Kerberos ticket granting ticket

Session key

IP address of X

Ticket lifetime

Kerberos Service Request

- $U \rightarrow G$: K_{UG}\{userID, t\}, K_{SG}\{T\}, req(F), n'_U
- $G \rightarrow U$: $K_{UG}\{K_{UF}, n'_U\}$, $K_F\{T(U,F)\}$
- $U \rightarrow F$: K_{UF}\{userID, t\}, $K_F\{T(U,F)\}$

Kerberos Benefits

- Distributed access control
  - No passwords communicated over the network
- Cryptographic protection against spoofing
  - All accesses mediated by G (ticket granting server)
- Limited period of validity
  - Servers check timestamps against ticket validity
  - Limits window of vulnerability
- Timestamps prevent replay attacks
  - Servers check timestamps against their own clocks to ensure “fresh” requests
- Mutual authentication
  - User sends nonce challenges

Kerberos Drawbacks

- Requires available ticket granting server
  - Could become a bottleneck
  - Must be reliable
- All servers must trust G, G must trust servers
  - They share unique keys
- Kerberos requires synchronized clocks
  - Replay can occur during validity period
  - Not easy to synchronize clocks
- User's machine could save & replay passwords
  - Password is a weak spot
- Kerberos does not scale well
  - Hard to replicate authentication server and ticket granting server
  - Duplicating keys is bad, extra keys = more management