

CSE 380 Computer Operating Systems

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Lecture Note: Security

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Preface

- Early (unix systems) security
 - Security by obscurity
 - Those that know enough to break the system also know enough not to
- RTM
 - The Great Internet Worm of 1988
 - Devastating watershed event in hacker history
 - First awareness of internet security
- Legendary literatures:
 - *Hackers* – Steven Levy
 - *Cyberpunk* – Hafner and Markoff
 - *The Cuckoo's Egg* – Clifford Stoll
 - *The Jargon File*

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Hackers vs Crackers

- The word **hack** doesn't have 69 different meanings
 - an appropriate application of ingenuity
 - a creative/brilliant practical joke
- **Legendary hacks are revered as urban folklores**
 - The element of cleverness
 - A flare for classic hacker's humor and style, which includes references to Adams, Tolkien as well as jargons
 - Mostly harmless
 - Caltech/MIT football pranks
 - Robin Hood/Friar Tuck against Xerox
- **There is no cure against bored students**

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Robin Hood/Friar Tuck

IX id1

id1: Friar Tuck... I am under attack! Pray save me!

id1: Off (aborted)

id2: Fear not, friend Robin! I shall rout the Sheriff of Nottingham's men!

id1: Thank you, my good fellow!

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Terminology

- Vulnerability (weakness/defects that can be exploited)
 - Ill-chosen passwords
 - Software bugs
 - Communication without encryption
 - Incorrect set-ups
- Attack (ways of exploiting vulnerability)
 - Password crackers
 - Viruses and worms
 - Denial of service
- Intruders (adversaries that try to attack)
 - Terrorists
 - Espionage
 - Hackers

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Security Goals

- Data Confidentiality
 - Keep data and communication secret
 - Privacy of personal financial/health records etc
 - Military and commercial relevance
- Data Integrity
 - Protect reliability of data against tampering
 - Can we be sure of the source and content of information?
- System Availability
 - Data/resources should be accessible when needed
 - Protection against denial of service attacks

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Sample Tools

- Cryptography
 - Can ensure confidentiality and integrity
 - Typically used for authentication
- Firewalls, passwords, access control
 - Authorization mechanisms
- Operating systems
 - Resource allocation
 - Monitoring and logging for audits
- Java bytecode verifier
 - Memory safety against malicious/defective code

We do not have adequate technology today!

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
Basics

Terminology

- *Authentication:* Verifying identity of sender and/or message integrity
- *Integrity:* Message tampering detection
- *Plaintext:* Original message
- *Ciphertext:* Encrypted message
- *Key:* Input for en- and decryption algorithm
- *Encryption:* Plaintext + Key → Ciphertext
- *Decryption:* Ciphertext + Key → Plaintext

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Basic Set-up of Cryptography



Relationship between the plaintext and the ciphertext

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Encryption Algorithms

Symmetric

- Encryption and decryption use the same key
- Key must be secret (secret key)
- Best known: DES, AES, IDEA, Blowfish, RC5


Asymmetric

- Also known as Public Key Encryption
- Encryption and decryption keys *different*

DES - Data Encryption Standard, IDEA - International Data Encryption Algorithm, AES - Advanced Encryption System

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Symmetric Encryption



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Monoalphabetic Ciphers

- Classical way of encoding text strings (Caesar Cipher)
- Permutation of the alphabet (rot13)
- The key for decoding is the inverse permutation
- Encoding and decoding are efficient
- Theoretically sound: the number of permutations of ASCII alphabet is VERY large (128!), and an intruder cannot possibly try out all possible permutations to decipher
- Main problem: Any human language has distinct frequent letter (e.g. vowels) combos
 - E.g. **e** is the most common letter in English text, **th** is the most common sequence of adjacent symbols
 - Given enough cipher text, one doesn't need to be Sherlock Holmes to break the code

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Secret-Key Cryptography

- Sender and receiver share the secret key
- This is also called symmetric key cryptography
- A popular scheme for many years: DES (Data Encryption Standard) promoted by NSA
 - Key is 56 bits (extended to 64 bits using 8 parity bits)
 - Input data is processed in chunks of 64-bit blocks, by subjecting to a series of transformations using the key
- Distribution of keys is a problem

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Asymmetric Encryption

- Two complementary keys
 - Private key (kept secret)
 - Public key (published)
- Private key VERY difficult to compute from public key
- Encryption with one key can only be reversed with the other key
- Used in PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) & PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)
- Best known RSA & ECC, DSA for signatures

RSA Rivest Shami Adleman, ECC - Elliptic Curve Cryptography, DSA - Digital Signature Algorithm


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One-Way Functions

- Function such that given formula for $f(x)$
 - easy to evaluate $y = f(x)$ given x
- But given y
 - computationally infeasible to find x
- There is a rich theory of one-way functions
 - Many candidates proposed
 - None of them "proved" to be one way
 - Existence of one-way functions linked to encryption, random number generators, (and other crypto concepts) in a precise sense

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Asymmetric Encryption cont'd



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Public-Key Cryptography

- All users pick a public key/private key pair
 - publish the public key
 - private key not published
- Public key is the encryption key
 - To send a message to user Alice, encrypt the message with Alice's public key
- Private key is the decryption key
 - Alice decrypts the ciphertext with its private key
- Popular schemes (1970s): Diffie-Hellman, RSA

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More on RSA

- Introduced by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman in 1979
- Foundations in number theory and computational difficulty of factoring
- Not mathematically proven to be unbreakable, but has withstood attacks and analysis
 - Ideally, we would like to prove a theorem saying "if intruder does not know the key, then it cannot construct plaintext from the ciphertext by executing a polynomial-time algorithm"
- Public and private keys are derived from secretly chosen large prime numbers (512 bits)
- Plaintext is viewed as a large binary number and encryption is exponentiation in modulo arithmetic
- Intruder will have to factor large numbers (and there are no known polynomial-time algorithms for this)
 - 2002's major result: polynomial-time test to check if a number is prime

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Hash Functions

- Produce *hash values* for data access or security
- *Hash value*: Number generated from a string of text
- Hash is substantially smaller than the text itself
- Unlikely that other text produces the same hash value (collision resistance)
- Unidirectional (cannot calculate text from hash)
- Provides: Integrity & Authentication
- Best known: SHA-1 & MD5

SHA - Secure Hash Algorithm, MD5 - Message Digest

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Digital Signatures

- How can Alice *sign* a digital document ?
- Let $S(A,M)$ be the message M tagged with Alice's signature
- **No forgery possible**: If Alice signs M then nobody else can generate $S(A,M)$
- **Authenticity check**: If you get the message $S(A,M)$ you should be able to verify that this is really created by Alice
- **No alteration**: Once Alice sends $S(A,M)$, nobody (including Alice) can tamper this message
- **No reuse**: Alice cannot duplicate $S(A,M)$ at a later time


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Digital Signatures with Public Keys

- Suppose K is public key and k is private key for Alice, and encryption/decryption is commutative:
 $D(E(M,K), k) = E(D(M,k), K) = M$
- To sign a message M , Alice simply sends $D(M,k)$
- Receiver uses Alice's public key to compute $E(D(M,k), K)$, to retrieve M
 - Authenticity of signature because only Alice knows the private key k
- RSA encryption does satisfy the required commutativity
- To ensure "no reuse" and "no alteration" the message must include a timestamp
- The scheme is made more efficient by computing $D(H(M), k)$, where $H(M)$ is the *secure hash* of M
 - Hashing gives a constant size output
 - Hard to invert


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Hash Functions cont'd



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Hash Functions cont'd




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PKI in a Nutshell

- PKI (**P**ublic **K**ey **I**nfrastructure) based on
 - Certificates (X.509)
 - Chain of trust (usually hierarchy)
- Certificates**
 - Public keys signed by a trusted 3rd party
 CA = Certificate Authority
 - Certificate is public as well
 - Different types for people, web server, ...

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Certificate creation



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User Authentication

Authentication is the process of determining which user is making a request

Basic Principles. Authentication must identify:

1. Something the user knows (e.g. password)
2. Something the user has (e.g. ID card)
3. Something user is (e.g. retina scan)

Humans are the weakest link

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Passwords

- The most commonly used way of authentication
- Vulnerabilities
 - Stealing passwords
 - Poorly chosen passwords that are easy to guess
 - Attacks that search through password directories
- If you were to guess passwords, how would you go about doing that?
- Survey of passwords by Morris&Thomson: could guess 86% of all passwords
 - 15 single ASCII letters
 - 72 two ASCII letters
 - 464 three ASCII letters
 - Words from dictionary, names of people/streets

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Systems are easy to crack!

```
LBL> telnet elxsi
ELXSI AT LBL
LOGIN: root
PASSWORD: root
INCORRECT PASSWORD, TRY AGAIN
LOGIN: guest
PASSWORD: guest
INCORRECT PASSWORD, TRY AGAIN
LOGIN: uucp
PASSWORD: uucp
WELCOME TO THE ELXSI COMPUTER AT LBL
```

- How a cracker broke into LBL
 - a U.S. Dept. of Energy research lab

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Password Attacks

- ❑ Deadly combo:
 - War dialers / password guessing
- ❑ Once entrance to a system is gained:
 - password file
 - packet sniffer
 - rsh/rlogin into other machines with known usr/passwd combo
- ❑ Social Engineering

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Unix: /etc/passwd

- ❑ Passwords stored in a file system are vulnerable to automated attacks
 - At first Unix was implemented with a password file holding the actual passwords of users, but with only root permissions.
- ❑ This had many vulnerabilities
 - Copies were made by privileged users
 - Copies were made by bugs: classic example posted password file on daily message file

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Improvements to First Approach

- ❑ Enforce password rules
 - Makes the passwords harder to guess or crack with dictionaries
 - Problems?
- ❑ Hashing and encryption: use password to create a key, then hash based on the DES algorithm for encryption
 - Speed OK for legitimate users
 - Takes longer to do automatic search
- ❑ Password files contains these encrypted entries
- ❑ Intruder cannot figure out the passwords just by gaining access to password file, but can keep guessing passwords, apply hash/encryption and compare the results to entries in password file

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Add Salt

- ❑ "Salt" the passwords by adding random bits.
 - Makes dictionary attacks more expensive.
 - Decreases the likelihood that two identical passwords will appear as identical entries in the password file.
- ❑ 12 bit salt results in 4,096 versions of each password.
- ❑ /etc/passwd entry:

❑ How does this help?

user_id	Salt	Hash(salt + passwd)	...
---------	------	---------------------	-----

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Hash-based 1-time Passwords

- Goal: Can the password be different in every session?
 - code books
- Scheme used for remote logins based on one-way hash functions
- One-time setup.
 - User chooses a password w
 - Fixes a constant t for the number of times the authentication can be done using password w
 - User declares the password $H^t(w)$ to the system the first time
 $H(H(\dots(H(w))\dots))$

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One time passwords

- Initially, the computer stores, with user's login-id, password $p=H^t(w)$ and session number $s=0$
- After i sessions the computer has $p=H^{t-i}(w)$ and $s=i$
- At the time of login, computer sends i to the user
- User computes new password $q=H^{t-i-1}(w)$ and sends it to the computer
- The computer checks that $H(q)=p$, and if so, allows the login (and updates local entries to q and $i+1$)
- Important property: given q , it is easy to compute $H(q)$, but if intruder had stolen p in the last session, it cannot produce q
 - H is a one-way hash function, hard to invert

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Operating System Security

- Trojan horses
 - Free programs available to be downloaded and executed
 - Common trick: place altered versions of utility programs in user directories
- Login Spoofing
 - Simulate the login session to acquire passwords
- Logic Bomb
- Trap Doors
 - System programmer writes code to bypass normal checks
 - Insider knowledge to exploit these intentional vulnerabilities

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Buffer Overflow Attacks


- > 50% of security incidents reported at CERT (see cert.org) are due to buffer overflow attacks
- C and C++ programming languages don't do array bounds checks
 - In particular, widely used library functions such as `strcpy`, `gets`
- Exploited in many famous attacks (read your Windows Service Pack notes)

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C's Control Stack

```
f() {
  g(parameter);
}

g(char *args) {
  int x;
  // more local
  // variables
  ...
}
```




Before calling g

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C's Control Stack

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```




After calling g

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Buffer Overflow Example

```
g(char *text) {
  char buffer[128];
  strcpy(buffer, text);
}
```




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Buffer Overflow Example

```
g(char *text) {
  char buffer[128];
  strcpy(buffer, text);
}
```

Upon return from g, attack code gets executed !



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Solutions

- Don't write code in C
 - Use a safe language instead (Java, C#, ...)
 - Not always possible (low level programming)
 - Doesn't solve legacy code problem
- Link C code against safe version of libc
 - May degrade performance unacceptably
- Software fault isolation
 - Instrument executable code to insert checks
- Program analysis techniques
 - Examine program to see whether "tainted" data is used as argument to `strcpy`

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Avoiding Titanics

- Unix
 - `lpr`
 - link core to `/etc/passwd`
- Microsoft
 - code red (buffer overflow in IIS Indexing Service)
- Weathering actual attacks is the best way to make an OS safe
 - tiger teams
- System design should be public
- Keep the design simple


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Network Security

- External threat
 - code transmitted to target machine
 - code executed there, doing damage
- Goals of virus writer
 - quickly spreading virus
 - difficult to detect
 - hard to get rid of
- Virus = program can reproduce itself
 - by attaching its code to another program
 - additionally, do harm
- Worm
 - self-replicating


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The Morris Internet Worm



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Virus Attachment: Append



- ❑ Simplest case: insert copy at the end of an executable file
- ❑ Runs before other code of the program (by changing start address in header)
- ❑ Most common program virus


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Kinds of Viruses

- ❑ Overwriting Viruses
 - Companion Viruses
 - Executable Viruses
- ❑ Parasitic Viruses
 - Cavity Viruses
- ❑ Memory-resident Viruses
 - System-call-trap Viruses
 - Software Viruses (Windows manager, explorer, etc)
- ❑ Boot Sector Viruses
- ❑ Device Driver Viruses
- ❑ Macro Viruses

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
Bootstrap Viruses



- ❑ Bootstrap Process:
 - Firmware (ROM) copies MBR (master boot record) to memory, jumps to that program
- ❑ MBR (or Boot Sector)
 - Fixed position on disk
 - "Chained" boot sectors permit longer Bootstrap Loaders

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Bootstrap Viruses



- ❑ Virus breaks the chain
- ❑ Inserts virus code
- ❑ Reconnects chain afterwards

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Why the Boot Sector?

- ❑ Automatically executed *before* OS is running
 - Also before detection tools are running
- ❑ OS hides boot sector information from users
 - Hard to discover that the virus is there
 - Harder to fix
- ❑ Any good virus scanning software scans the boot sectors

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Macro Viruses

- ❑ Macros are just programs
- ❑ Word processors & Spreadsheets
 - Startup macro
 - Macros turned on by default
- ❑ Visual Basic Script (VBScript)

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Melissa Virus

- ❑ Transmission Rate
 - The first confirmed reports of Melissa were received on Friday, March 26, 1999.
 - By Monday, March 29, it had reached more than 100,000 computers.
 - One site got 32,000 infected messages in 45 minutes.
- ❑ Damage
 - Denial of service: mail systems off-line.
 - Could have been much worse

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Melissa Macro Virus

- ❑ Implementation
 - VBA (Visual Basic for Applications) code associated with the "document.open" method of Word
- ❑ Strategy
 - Email message containing an infected Word document as an attachment
 - Opening Word document triggers virus if macros are enabled
- ❑ Propagation
 - Sends email message to first 50 entries in every Outlook address book readable by the user executing the macro

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"I Love You" Virus/Worm

- ❑ Infection Rate
 - At 5:00 pm EDT May 8, 2000, CERT had received reports from more than 650 sites
 - > 500,000 individual systems
- ❑ VBScript
- ❑ Propagation
 - Email, Windows file sharing, IRC, USENET news
- ❑ Signature
 - An attachment named "LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.TXT.VBS"
 - A subject of "ILOVEYOU"
 - Message body: "kindly check the attached LOVELETTER coming from me."

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Love Bug Behavior

- ❑ Replaced certain files with copies of itself
 - Based on file extension (e.g. .vbs, .js, .hta, etc)
- ❑ Changed Internet Explorer start page
 - Pointed the browser to infected web pages
- ❑ Mailed copies of itself
- ❑ Changed registry keys

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Antivirus and Anti-Antivirus Techniques

- ❑ Scanning the disk for certain executables
 - hard to deal with polymorphic viruses
- ❑ Integrity checkers using checksums
- ❑ Behavioral checkers
- ❑ Virus avoidance
 - good OS
 - install only shrink-wrapped software
 - do not click on attachments to email
 - use antivirus software
 - frequent backups
- ❑ Recovery from virus attack
 - halt computer, reboot from safe disk, run antivirus

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