An examination of the place of the mind-body problem in relation to analytic epistemology in early twentieth-century philosophy. Analytic philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century included two streams, one founded on logical analysis (Frege, Russell, early Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine), another on reflections about perception, knowledge, and the problem of the external world (Moore, Russell, early Carnap, Price, Ayer, Wittgentstein). This seminar focuses on the second stream, and especially problems about sense-data and perceptual realism. Perceptual realism concerns both what we see and what there is: Do we see sense-data or the like (Russell's neutral monism), or do material objects simply make themselves present to us in perception (naive direct realism)? Are sense-data intermediate representatives of an external world (indirect realism), or do they bring us into contact with that world directly (critical realism)? These debates about perceptual knowledge were conditioned by attempts to resolve the mind-body problem, especially by adopting a form of monism (James' and Russell's neutral monism). Others adopted forms of parallelism (Wundt), or physicalistic monism (Smart, Armstrong), or a problematic dualism in search of a monism (W. Sellars). We will study the interaction between the mind-body problem and perceptual realism. Readings selected from Moore, Russell, Broad, Price, Prichard, Lovejoy, R. W. Sellars, Smythies, and W. Sellars, among others.

The seminar is aimed at doctoral students in philosophy and presupposes that its members have had graduate-level coursework in philosophy. Accordingly, advanced undergraduates who wish to take the course need permission and should have a previous philosophy course at the 400- or 500-level.