"Types are the leaven of computer programming: they make it digestible." - R. Milner

Types à la Milner

Benjamin C. Pierce University of Pennsylvania

April 2012

Type inference

Abstract types

Types à la Milner

Types for interaction

(Types for differential privacy)

Milner and me

- Last ML postdoc at Edinburgh
 - and first-generation at Cambridge
- Happy ML user Unison



• Pict programming language (with Dave Turner)



Software

Benjamin C. Pierce Chris Casinghino Aichael Greenberg Vilhelm Sjöberg Brent Yorgey

Andrew Tolmac

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SDate: 2011-10-10 12:42:15 -0400 (Mon. 10 Oct 2011) 5

Foundations

with Andrew W. Appel, Arthur Chargueraud, Anthony Cowley, Jeffrey Foster, Michael Hicks, Ranjit Jhala, Greg

Morrisett, Chung-chieh Shan, Leonid Spesivtsev, and

Overview

Download

lambda-calculus pi-calculus ML, Haskell, Scheme, ...

Pict

- Local type inference -> = Scala
- POPLMark and Software Foundations




A Theory of Type Polymorphism in Programming

ROBIN MILNER

Computer Science Department, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland

Received October 10, 1977; revised April 19, 1978

The aim of this work is largely a practical one. A widely employed style of programming, particularly in structure-processing languages which impose no discipline of types, entails defining procedures which work well on objects of a wide variety. We present a formal type discipline for such polymorphic procedures in the context of a simple programming language, and a compile time type-checking algorithm \mathcal{W} which enforces the discipline. A Semantic Soundness Theorem (based on a formal semantics for the language) states that well-type programs cannot "go wrong" and a Syntactic Soundness Theorem states that if \mathcal{W} accepts a program then it is well typed. We also discuss extending these results to richer languages; a type-checking algorithm based on \mathcal{W} is in fact already implemented and working, for the metalanguage ML in the Edinburgh LCF system.



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Consider the list mapping function:

letrec map(f, m) = if null (m) then nil else cons (f(hd(m)), map (f, tl(m)))

For example: map(square, [1,2,3]) = [1,4,9]

A good type for map is:

$$((\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \times \alpha \ list) \rightarrow \beta \ list$$

Type inference

It is remarkably conven-

ient in interactive programming to be relieved of the need to specify types, with assurance that badly-typed phrases will be caught, reported, and not evaluated.

> A Metalanguage for interactive proof in LCF M. Gordon, R. Milner, L. Morris, M. Newey, C. Wadsworth (POPL 1982)

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letrec map(f, m) = if null (m) then nil else cons (f(hd(m)), map (f, tl(m)))

 $\sigma_{map} = \sigma_f \times \sigma_m \rightarrow \rho_1$ $\sigma_{\text{null}} = \sigma_{\text{m}} \rightarrow bool$ $\sigma_{hd} = \sigma_m \rightarrow \rho_2$ $\sigma_{tl} = \sigma_m \rightarrow \rho_3$ $\sigma_f = \rho_2 \rightarrow \rho_4$ $\sigma_{map} = \sigma_f \times \rho_3 \rightarrow \rho_5$ $\sigma_{cons} = \rho_4 \times \rho_5 \rightarrow \rho_6$ $\sigma_{nil} = \rho_6$ $\rho_1 = \rho_6$

letrec map
$$(f, m) = if$$
 null (m) then nil
else cons $(f(hd(m)), map (f, tl(m)))$

$$\sigma_{map} = \sigma_{f} \times \sigma_{m} \rightarrow \rho_{1} \qquad \sigma_{null} = \tau_{k} \text{ list } \rightarrow \text{bool}$$

$$\sigma_{null} = \sigma_{m} \rightarrow \text{bool} \qquad \sigma_{nil} = \tau_{k} \text{ list}$$

$$\sigma_{hd} = \sigma_{m} \rightarrow \rho_{2} \qquad \sigma_{hd} = \tau_{k} \text{ list } \rightarrow \sigma_{k3}$$

$$\sigma_{tl} = \sigma_{m} \rightarrow \rho_{3} \qquad \sigma_{tl} = \tau_{k} \text{ list } \rightarrow \sigma_{k4} \text{ list}$$


$$\sigma_{f} = \rho_{2} \rightarrow \rho_{4} \qquad \sigma_{cons} = ((\tau_{s} \times \sigma_{s}) \text{ list}) \rightarrow \sigma_{s} \text{ list}$$

$$\sigma_{map} = \sigma_{f} \times \rho_{3} \rightarrow \rho_{5}$$

$$\sigma_{cons} = \rho_{4} \times \rho_{5} \rightarrow \rho_{6}$$

$$\sigma_{nil} = \rho_{6} \qquad Most \text{ general solution}$$

$$\rho_{1} = \rho_{6} \qquad \sigma_{map} = (\sigma_{m} \rightarrow \rho_{4}) \times \sigma_{m} \text{ list } \rightarrow \rho_{4} \text{ list}$$
Principal type $\rightarrow \sigma_{map} = (\gamma \rightarrow \delta) \times \gamma \text{ list } \rightarrow \delta \text{ list}$



(P +Turner)

Local Type Inference

- Problem: How to combine
 - impredicative polymorphism
 - subtyping
 - type inference
- Idea: Abandon full type inference
 - just infer "locally best types" where possible
- When type arguments are omitted:
 - Compare actual and expected types of provided term arguments to yield a set of subtyping constraints on missing type arguments
 - Choose solution that satisfies these constraints while making the result type of the whole application as small (informative) as possible



What to call it?

37k google hits

Hindley-Milner?

Damas-Milner?

4k hits

Damas-Hindley-Milner?

Milner's contribution

- Defined algorithm W
 - Generate a set of equational constraints from a program and use Robinson's unification algorithm to solve them
 - Generalize variables appropriately at let-bindings
- Proved soundness
 - Gave a (standard) denotational model for core ML
 - Showed that well-typed terms do not denote the special element wrong in the model
 - Showed that algorithm W finds some type for every well-typed term (and no ill-typed term)
- Conjectured completeness

Milner, A Theory of Type Polymorphism in Programming, 1978

Damas's contribution

- Proof of the completeness of Algorithm W
 - For every well-typed term, the algorithm finds a *principal type*, from which all other types for the term can be derived as instances

Damas and Milner, Principal Type Schemes for Functional Programs, 1982

Hindley's contribution

- Algorithm for inferring principal type schemes for terms in combinatory logic (S-K terms)
 - Also relied on Robinson's algorithm for solving equality constraints

Hindley, The Principal Type-scheme of an Object in Combinatory Logic, 1969

Curry's contribution

- Independent proof of Hindley's main result
 - ... but not relying directly on Robinson's algorithm

... and don't forget Morris '68! ... or Newman '43!

Curry, Modified basic functionality in combinatory logic, 1969

What to call it?

- Hindley-Milner (or Curry-Hindley-Milner-Morris-Newman!)
 - for unification-based type inference
- Milner
 - for the extension to let-polymorphism
- Damas-Milner
 - for the proof of completeness (principal types) for the let-polymorphism extension

Types in LCF


In LCF we give the user the freedom to write his own tactics (in ML) but the type-checker ensures that these cannot perform faulty proofs - at worst a tactic can lead to an unwanted theorem (for example which does not achieve the desired goal).

The principal aims then in designing ML were to make it impossible to prove non-theorems yet easy to program strategies for performing proofs.

> Gordon, Milner, Morris, Newey, and Wadsworth, A Metalanguage For Interactive Proof in LCF, 1977

An abstract type of theorems

LCF is basically a programming language (ML) with a predefined abstract type of <u>theorems</u>



An abstract type of theorems

LCF is basically a programming language (ML) with a predefined abstract type of <u>theorems</u>

abstype thm with ASSUME : formula → thm GEN : thm → thm TRANS : thm → thm → thm

> Code outside of the abstype's implementation can *only* build theorems by calling these functions!

Types for Interaction

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lambda-calculus [Church, 1940s]	pi-calculus [Milner, Parrow, Walker, 1989]
core calculus of functional computation	core calculus of concurrent processes, communicating with messages over channels
everything is a function • all arguments and results of functions are functions	 everything is processes and channels the only thing processes do is communicate over channels the data exchanged when processes communicate is just a tuple of channels
all computation is function application	all computation is communication
common data and control structures encodable	common data and control structures encodable including functions!

Pi-calculus

- P,Q ::= 0 inert process
 - P | Q P and Q in parallel
 - P arbitrarily many copies of P in parallel
 - $x?(y_1..., y_n)$. P read $y_1..., y_n$ from channel x and continue as P
 - $x!(y_1...y_n)$. P send $y_1...y_n$ along channel x and continue as P
 - Vx. P private channel x in P

 $\left(x! \; (y_1 ... y_n). \; P \right) \; \left| \; \left(x? \; (z_1 ... z_n). \; Q \right) \; \Rightarrow \; P \; \left| \; \left([y_1 ... y_n/z_1 ... z_n] Q \right) \right. \right.$

Milner's sort system

- Each channel is associated with a subject sort
- Each subject sort is associated with an object sort, which is a tuple of subject sorts
- A process is well typed if, at every send and receive, the object sort of the channel used for communication matches the subject sorts of the channels being sent or received

 $\{ \text{NAT} \mapsto (\text{SUCC}, \text{ZERO}), \text{ SUCC} \mapsto (\text{NAT}), \text{ ZERO} \mapsto () \} \neq \blacksquare$

 $\{ \text{NAT} \mapsto (\text{SUCC}, \text{ZERO}), \text{SUCC} \mapsto (\text{NAT}), \text{ZERO} \mapsto () \}$

Milner, The Polyadic Pi-Calculus: A Tutorial, 1991

Structural types for pi

- associate each channel binder directly with a type
- make recursion explicit

 $\{ \text{ NAT} \mapsto (\text{SUCC}, \text{ZERO}), \text{ SUCC} \mapsto (\text{NAT}), \text{ ZERO} \mapsto () \}$

Polymorphic pi

 On each communication, pass a tuple of types and a tuple of channels

(P + Sangiorgi)

- Analogous to full 2nd-order lambda-calculus

e.g., ch(X, ch(X)) ch(X,Y, ch(X,ch(Y)), list X, list Y) where list X = ch(ch(X), ch())

Pi + subtyping

- Separate read and write capabilities
- cf Reynolds's treatment of refs in Forsythe
- $T ::= ch(T_1...T_n)$

...

 $in(T_1...T_n)$ $out(T_1...T_n)$

read *and* write capabilities for channel carrying $(T_1...T_n)$ read capability only write capability only

(P + Sangiorgi)

Linear pi

- Track use-once capabilities
- cf. linear logic, linear lambda-calculi
- $T ::= ch(T_1...,T_n)$ $ch!(T_1...,T_n)$


...

ordinary channel use-once channel

(Kobayashi, P, Turner)


Behavioral consequences

- Each of these refinements has interesting effects on behavioral equivalences
- E.g., in the pi-calculus with subtyping, we get stronger versions of standard theorems
 - e.g. a stronger *replicator theorem* than in the untyped language
- Validates beta-reduction for the pi-calculus encoding of CBV lambda-calculus
 - (not valid for untyped pi)





Joint work with Jason Reed, Andreas Haeberlen, Marco Gaboardi, Arjun Narayan, ...



- A vast trove of data is accumulating in databases
- This data could be useful for many things
 - Example: Use hospital records for medical studies
- But how to release it without violating privacy?

Privacy is <u>hard</u>!

Idea #I:Anonymize the data


- Patient #147, DOB 11/08/1965, zip code 19104, smokes and has lung cancer"
- What fraction of the U.S. population is uniquely identified by their ZIP code and their full DOB?
 63.3%
- Another example: Netflix dataset de-anonymized in 2008

Idea #2:Aggregate the data

- "385 patients both smoke and have lung cancer"
- Problem: Someone might know that 384 patients smoke + have cancer, but isn't sure about Benjamin

Need a more principled approach!

Approach: Differential privacy



- Idea:Add a bit of noise to the answer
 - "387 patients smoke + have cancer, plus or minus 3"
- Can bound how much information is leaked
 - Even under worst-case assumptions!

Problem: How much noise?

What if someone asks the following:

 "What is the number of people in the database who are called Andreas, multiplied by 1,000,000"

How do we know...

- whether it is okay to answer this (given our bound)?
- and, if so, how much noise we need to add?
- Analysis can be done manually...
 - Example: McSherry/Mironov [KDD'09] on Netflix data
- ... but this does not scale!
 - Each database owner would have to hire a 'privacy expert'
 - Analysis is nontrivial what if the expert makes a mistake?

The Fuzz system OK to query(db:database) { answer num = 0;How many patients foreach xEdb if (x.smokes & with lung cancer are Fuzz x.hasCancer) heavy smokers? then num ++; 0 return num; Answer 387 (incl noise) 387 Bob Alice

- We are working on a "programming language for privacy" called Fuzz
 - Bob writes question in our language & submits it to Alice
 - Alice runs the program through our Fuzz system
 - Fuzz tells Alice whether it is okay to respond...
 - ... as well as a safe answer (including just enough noise)


How does Fuzz do this?

$\frac{r \ge 1}{var}$	$\frac{\Delta \vdash e_1 : \tau_1 \qquad \Gamma \vdash e_2 : \tau_2}{\square} \otimes I$	
$\Gamma, x:_r \tau \vdash x: \tau$	$\Delta + \Gamma \vdash (e_1, e_2) : \tau_1 \otimes \tau_2 $	
$\Gamma \vdash e : \tau_1 \otimes \tau_2 \qquad \Delta,$	$x:_r \tau_1, y:_r \tau_2 \vdash e': \tau' \\ \boxtimes E$	
$\Delta + r\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{let}(x, y) = e \mathbf{in} e' : \tau'$		
$\Gamma \vdash e_1 : \tau_1 \qquad \Gamma \vdash e_2 : \tau_2$	$\&I \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash e : \tau_1 \& \tau_2}{\underbrace{\qquad} \&E}$	
$\Gamma \vdash \langle e_1, e_2 \rangle : \tau_1 \And \tau_2$	$\Gamma \vdash \pi_i \ e : \tau_i \qquad \& E$	
$\Delta, x :_r \tau_1 \vdash e_1 : \tau'$		
$\Gamma \vdash e : \tau_1 + \tau_2$	$\Delta, x :_r \tau_2 \vdash e_2 : \tau' + E$	
$\Delta + r\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{case} e \mathbf{of} x.e_1 \mid x.e_2 : \tau' + E$		

$\frac{\Gamma \vdash e : \tau_i}{-\!-\!-\!-\!-} + I$		
$\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{inj}_i e : \tau_1 + \tau_2$	$\Gamma \vdash \lambda x.e : \tau \multimap \tau'$	
$\frac{\Delta \vdash e_1 : \tau \multimap \tau' \qquad \Gamma \vdash e_2 : \tau}{- \circ \tau} = - \circ \tau'$	$E \qquad \frac{\Gamma, x :_{\infty} \tau \vdash e : \tau'}{\longrightarrow} \rightarrow I$	
$\Delta + \Gamma \vdash e_1 \ e_2 : \tau'$	$\Gamma \vdash \lambda x.e: \tau \to \tau'$	
$\Delta \vdash e_1 : \tau \to \tau' \qquad \Gamma \vdash e_2 : \tau$	$\Gamma \vdash e : \tau$ I	
$\Delta + \infty \Gamma \vdash e_1 \ e_2 : \tau'$	$s\Gamma \vdash !e: !_s \tau$	
$\frac{\Gamma \vdash e : !_s \tau \qquad \Delta, x :_{rs} \tau \vdash e' : \tau'}{2}$	$F = \frac{\Gamma \vdash e : [\mu \alpha . \tau / \alpha] \tau}{\mu I}$	
$\Delta + r\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{let} ! x = e \mathbf{in} e' : \tau'$	$\Gamma \vdash \operatorname{fold}_{\mu \alpha. \tau} e : \tau$	
$\Gamma \vdash e : \tau$	$ \mu E$	
$\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{unfold} \ e : [\mu lpha. au / lpha] au^{r-1}$		

- Fuzz uses a type system to infer the relevant property (sensitivity) of a given query
 - If program typechecks, we have a proof that running it won't compromise privacy
 - Solid formal guarantee no more accidental privacy leaks!

Intuition behind the type system



- Suppose we have a function f(x)=2x+7
 - What is its sensitivity?
 - Intuitively 2: changing the input by 1 changes the output by 2

Current directions

- Type inference (!)
- Adding dependent types to express more precise constraints on behavior
 - E.g., the fact that the sensitivity of a private *k-means* algorithm depends on how many rounds of iteration you ask it to perform

Thank you!

