

(In)Stability Properties of Limit Order Dynamics

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LAST MATCH

Price 23.7790
Time 9:01:55.614

TODAY'S ACTIVITY

Orders 1,630
Volume 44,839

BUY ORDERS

SHARES	PRICE
1,000	23.7600
3,087	23.7500
200	23.7500
100	23.7400
1,720	23.7280
2,000	23.7200
1,000	23.7000
100	23.7000
100	23.7000
800	23.6970
500	23.6500
3,000	23.6500
4,300	23.6500
2,000	23.6500
200	23.6200

(195 more)

SELL ORDERS

SHARES	PRICE
100	23.7800
800	23.7990
500	23.8000
1,720	23.8070
900	23.8190
200	23.8500
1,000	23.8500
1,000	23.8500
1,000	23.8600
200	24.0000
500	24.0000
1,000	24.0300
200	24.0300
1,100	24.0400
500	24.0500

(219 more)

“Backtesting” of Trading Strategies

- Common microstructure backtesting process:
 - assume access to historical limit order data
 - reconstruct complete order books at each point in time
 - insert **hypothetical** limit orders into the stream
 - simulate forward the execution of the hypothetical orders
- Faithfully simulates the **mechanical** aspects of market impact
- What about the **reactive** or “**psychological**” aspects?
- Formalize as a question about **dynamical stability**:
 - Make various assumptions about how future orders do or do not react to the past
 - *Can tiny perturbations of the limit order sequence cause dramatic future change?*
 - Butterfly Effects and Chaos

Two Models of Market Impact

- Both models deal with arbitrary, fixed sequences
- **Absolute model:**
 - market given by a sequence of “absolute” limit order prices (one share each)
 - e.g. $M = (p_1, \text{buy}), (p_2, \text{buy}), (p_3, \text{sell}), \dots$
 - order books constructed from sequence M
 - “mechanical” impact only
 - motivation:
 - traders with “inherent” valuations
 - traders with slow time scales, long investment horizons, poor microstructure access
- **Relative model:**
 - market given by a sequence of limit order prices **relative to current bid & ask**
 - e.g. $M' = (d_1, \text{buy}), (d_2, \text{buy}), (d_3, \text{sell}), \dots$
 - construct order books & actual prices **in concert with each other**
 - e.g. limit price $p_2 = \text{current bid} + d_2$; limit price $p_3 = \text{current ask} + d_3$; etc.
 - crude form of “psychological” or “reactive” impact
 - motivation:
 - traders “looking for a bargain”; trading off time for price
 - “penny-jumping”, optimized execution
 - high-frequency traders with low latency and full microstructure access
- ***How do these models differ?***

Stability

- Consider sequences in the two models:
 - absolute: $M = (p_1, \text{type}_1), (p_2, \text{type}_2), \dots$
 - relative: $M' = (d_1, \text{type}_1), (d_2, \text{type}_2), \dots$
- Now consider a small, arbitrary modification to each
 - e.g. deleting or adding a single order
 - (p_i, type_i) from M , (d_i, type_i) from M'
 - think of this as “our” action
- How much can such a change alter basic properties of the sequence?
 - stability = small change not amplified with time
 - instability = small change greatly amplified
- **Absolute model: Every “reasonable” property stable!**
 - volume executed, VWAP, closing price,...
 - note: must still be careful; some bounds depend on spread of M
 - generalizes to larger modifications, other types
- **Relative model: Most properties highly unstable!**
 - can find sequences (with bounded spread) such that single deletion causes arbitrarily large changes in volume executed, VWAP, closing price,...

Absolute Model Stability

- $\langle B, S \rangle$ = original buy and sell books (at some point in simulation)
- $\langle B', S' \rangle$ = modified buy and sell books (at the same point)
- Introduce “meta-states” with small “edit distance” between simulations
- E.g. meta-state where $B = B'$ and $S \cup \{s'\} = S' \cup \{s\}$ for some $s \neq s'$
- Main technical lemma establishes:






Figure 1: Diagram representing the set S of stable states and the possible movements transitions in it after the change.

Some Sobering Philosophy

- The “usual” backtesting concern:
 - Past strategy performance may not be indicative of hypothetical future performance
 - changes in underlying market conditions
 - overfitting the historical data
- An even worse concern:
 - Past strategy performance may not be indicative of hypothetical **past** performance!
 - well beyond measurable trading costs, mechanical market impact, etc.
- Standard backtesting methodologies implicitly assume an absolute model
 - May be fine on longer timescales, but potentially dangerous at microstructure level
 - Alternatives: only use actual past trades or live trading

Simulations



A Mixture Model

fraction α of absolute traders, $1-\alpha$ of relative traders, single order deletion

